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INTRODUCTION

Consider the following hypothetical scenario: Sally and Jane work at
Number One Computers, Inc. They both are sales representatives who sell
computers and computer equipment to large businesses. Jane has been with
Number One Computers, Inc. for five years and Sally for two. Jane graduated with a marketing degree from the University of Wisconsin. Sally was
forced to drop out of college after her third year for personal reasons. Jane
had the highest commission for the past two years selling $500,000 worth
of computer equipment. Sally's commission rate has been $200,000 for the
past two years. Joe is Sally and Jane's superior and is in the position to
promote both Sally and Jane. Sally has been having sexual intercourse with
Joe for the past six months. Jane has not been having sex with Joe, but she
knows of Sally and Joe's relationship because Sally had told her. Sally is
promoted to be a sales manager after her second year of being with the
company while Jane does not get a promotion. Our common sense, if not
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our common ideas of decency and ethics, tells us this is unfair.' But for
whom, if anyone, is there a legal cause of action?
The foregoing is a scenario involving a body of law usually referred to
as "sexual favoritism." 2 Typically, sexual favoritism is divided into two
categories: isolated instances of sexual favoritism and widespread sexual
favoritism. 3 In order to succeed on a claim of sexual favoritism, one must
be able to prove sexual harassment. Therefore, because isolated instances
of sexual favoritism are considered consensual sexual relationships, the vast
majority of courts have rejected any claim arising from an isolated instance
of sexual favoritism.' In short, in today's courts, no one would have any
legal recourse in our scenario involving Jane, Sally, and Joe.
The purpose of this Comment is to address the counterproductive
ramifications of this reality of our law. Since the enactment of Title VII, an
integral element of public policy in American jurisprudence has been to
promote equality between men and women in the workplace.6 Yet our
common law rejects arguments that would allow women like Jane to bring a
lawsuit. 7 Further, courts implicitly articulate a public policy that encourages
women like Sally to use their sexuality to further their careers. As an alternative to today's prevailing treatment by courts, this Comment calls for
1. EEOC POLICY GUIDANCE ON EMPLOYER LIABILITY UNDER TITLE VII FOR
SEXUAL FAVORITISM, http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/sexualfavor.html (last visited Nov.
13, 2009) [hereinafter EEOC POLICY GUIDANCE]. The EEOC Guidelines state that isolated
instances of sexual favoritism are "unfair" but not actionable under Title VII. Id.
2. See Mary Kate Sheridan, Just Because It 's Sex Doesn't Mean It's Because of
Sex: The Need for New Legislation to Target Sexual Favoritism, 40 COLUM. J.L. & Soc.
PROBS. 379, 383 (2007).
3. EEOC POLICY GUIDANCE, supra note 1.
4. Id.In order for a person to claim sexual favoritism, there must be evidence of
either quid pro quo or hostile work environment sexual harassment. Id.; see also Tenge v.
Phillips Modem Ag Co., 446 F.3d 903, 908 (8th Cir. 2006). See generally Mitchell Poole,
Paramours,Promotions,and Sexual Favoritism: Unfair, but is There Liability?, 25 PEPP. L.
REV. 819 (1998).
5. See Harvey v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 961 F. Supp. 1017, 1029 (S.D. Tex. 1997)
("Alleged favoritism to a paramour generally has been held not to constitute discrimination
in violation of Title VII because the alleged discrimination is not based on the plaintiff's
gender."); see also McGinnis v. Union Pac. R.R., 496 F.3d 868, 874 (8th Cir. 2007); Tenge,
446 F.3d at 908; Schobert v. Ill. Dep't of Transp., 304 F.3d 725, 733 (7th Cir. 2002); Murray
v. City of Winston-Salem, 203 F. Supp. 2d 493 (M.D.N.C. 2002); Riggs v. City of Banner,
159 F.Supp. 2d 1158, 1164 (D.Neb.2001).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(2)(a)-(c) (1964). Title VII makes itunlawful for public and
private employers, labor organizations, and employment agencies "to discriminate against
any individual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." Id.Title VII
stands for the proposition that similarly situated people should be treated equally, i.e.,
men
and women inthe workplace. See id.
7. Id.; see also McGinnis, 496 F.3d at 874; Tenge, 446 F.3d at 908; Schobert, 304
F.3d at 733; Murray, 203 F.Supp. 2d at 493; Riggs, 159 F.Supp. 2d at 1164; Harvey, 961 F.
Supp. at 1029.
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courts to apply a legal theory known as "sex-plus, 8 to isolated instances of
sexual favoritism. In doing so, ill-treated women like Jane, or men in a
similar situation, will have the opportunity to establish a prima facie case
under Title VII. 9

This Comment will begin by discussing the background of sexual harassment claims. This is important because sexual favoritism was first introduced under the theory of hostile work environments.'° It will argue that the
courts undermined the important socio-political purposes of sexual harassment law by rejecting sexual favoritism claims." This Comment will analyze some courts' resistance in recognizing sexual harassment as sex discrimination. These arguments are now being applied to sexual favoritism
claims.' 2 The argument that sexual harassment is not sex discrimination has
been invalidated. 13 The rationale that was invalidated in the context of sex14
ual harassment is equally invalid when it is applied to sexual favoritism.
This Comment will next discuss the emergence of sexual favoritism in
our legal system, which will include a brief overview of relevant cases and
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's (hereinafter "EEOC")
position on sexual favoritism.1 5 After reviewing relevant case law, we will
see how widespread sexual favoritism has been argued under a hostile work

8. See Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (recognizing the
validity of "sex-plus" theory). "Sex-plus" discrimination occurs when a person is subjected
to disparate treatment based not solely on one's sex, but rather on one's sex when "considered in conjunction with a second characteristic." Fisher v. Vassar Coll., 70 F.3d 1420, 1433
(2d Cir. 1995). With regard to sexual favoritism, the "plus" would be the sexual relationship.
9.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(2)(a)-(c) (1964). Title VII makes it unlawful for public and
private employers, labor organizations, and employment agencies "to discriminate against
any individual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." Id.
10.
See, e.g., Tenge, 446 F.3d at 908.
11.
Hennessy v. Penril Datacomm Networks, Inc., 69 F.3d 1344, 1353 (7th Cir.
1995) ("A major purpose of Title VII is to immunize the workplace from sexual intimidation
and repression."); see also ROBERT BELTON ET AL., EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW:
CASES AND MATERIALS ON EQUALITY IN THE WORKPLACE 442 (7th ed. 2004) (noting numerous studies that have documented the pervasiveness of sexual harassment in the workplace).
12.
See, e.g., EEOC POLICY GUIDANCE, supra note 1 ("An isolated instance of favoritism toward a 'paramour' . . . does not discriminate against women or men in violation
of Title VII, since both are disadvantaged for reasons other than their genders. A female
charging party who is denied an employment benefit because of such sexual favoritism
would not have been treated more favorably had she been a man ....).
13.
Michael J. Phillips, The Dubious Title VII Cause of Action for Sexual Favoritism, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 547, 551 (1994) (noting that at first some courts claimed that
sexual harassment was not sex discrimination because "both sexual harassment's perpetrators and its victims can be of either gender").
14.
Id.at 553 (noting that around 1980, "most of the early judicial resistance to the
concept of harassment as discrimination had melted away").
15.
See, e.g., EEOC POLICY GUIDANCE, supra note 1.
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environment theory. 16 By looking specifically at cases within the Seventh
Circuit of the United States and in Illinois courts, it is evident that a plaintiffs burden for proving a hostile work environment is too high.' 7 To ensure that individuals who are discriminated against because of their sex
combined with a sexual relationship or lack thereof have access to a remedy, sexual favoritism must be pleaded under a different legal theory.
Rather than operating under a hostile work environment argument, this
Comment will argue that sexual favoritism is a form of "sex-plus" discrimination. Under a sex-plus argument, a plaintiff must show that she was
discriminated against because of her sex in conjunction with a second characteristic.18 Therefore, a plaintiff in a sexual favoritism case utilizing the
sex-plus doctrine would argue that she was discriminated against because of
her sex plus the sexual relationship or lack thereof.
It will be argued that the courts' recognition of sexual favoritism
claims under a sex-plus theory would not require the creation of any new
law. 19 Instead, courts would merely apply existing common law and statutory law.20 Because sex-plus is limited in scope, the risk of an overwhelming, or even high, influx of litigation in this area of law is low. 21 Therefore,
it will be argued that the advantages of applying the sex-plus theory to sexual favoritism claims, allowing those with legitimate claims, like Jane, to
seek a remedy, comes at little or no risk of flooding court dockets.
16.
See DeCintio v. Westchester County Med. Ctr., 807 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1986);
Broderick v. Ruder, 685 F. Supp. 1269 (D.D.C. 1988); Miller v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 679
F. Supp. 495 (W.D. Pa. 1988); Priest v. Rotary, 634 F. Supp. 571 (N.D. Cal. 1986); King v.
Palmer, 598 F. Supp. 65 (D.D.C. 1984); Toscano v. Nimmo, 570 F. Supp. 1197 (D. Del
1983); see also McGinnis v. Union Pac. R.R., 496 F.3d 868, 874 (8th Cir. 2007); Tenge v
Phillips Modem Ag Co., 446 F.3d 903, 908 (8th Cir. 2006); Bartniak v. Cushman & Wakefield, Inc., 223 F. Supp. 2d 524, 531-32 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); Bonnor v. Guccione, 916 F. Supp.
271, 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
17.
See Whittaker v. N. Il. Univ., 424 F.3d 640, 645 (7th Cir. 2005). The Seventh
Circuit has found the severity requirement to be very high, stating that the workplace must
be "hellish" to be actionable. Id. (quoting Perry v. Harris Cherin, Inc., 126 F.3d 1010, 1013
(7th Cir. 1997)).
Fisher v. Vassar Coll., 70 F.3d 1420, 1433 (2d Cir. 1995).
18.
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973) (outlining the
19.
burden shifting model in employment discrimination cases under Title VII); Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (recognizing the validity of a "sex-plus" theory).
Plaintiffs claiming sexual favoritism under a sex-plus theory would still have to meet their
burden of persuasion and production. See Fisher, 70 F.3d 1420, 1433 (2d. Cir. 1995). Plaintiffs would have to show that the motivating factor in their denial of promotion was their sex
in conjunction with their lack of a sexual relationship. Id. This is very difficult to prove and
illustrated why isolated instances of sexual favoritism would be a very limited cause of
action. Hence, the painless transition that would be required, as only old law would be applied.
20.
See, e.g., Phillips,400 U.S. at 543-44 (1971).
21.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(2)(a)-(c) (1964).
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II. BACKGROUND
A. SEXUAL HARASSMENT AS SEX DISCRIMINATION

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it unlawful for public
and private employers, labor organizations, and employment agencies "to
discriminate against, any individual because of his race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin, or to classify or refer for employment any individual on
the basis of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin., 22 Sexual harassment is now recognized by courts as a form of sex discrimination under
Title VII. 23 However, this was not always the case. Initially, relying on the
reasoning that both males and females alike could potentially be victims of
sexual harassment, courts were reluctant to say that sexual harassment was
discrimination on the basis of sex. 24 At the same time, many feminist theorists formulated arguments articulating the many reasons why sexual harassment was indeed a form of sex discrimination and the social importance
of the courts recognizing it as such.25 These feminists argued that sexual
harassment kept women inferior to men in the workplace.2 6 They also argued that the courts, by rejecting sexual harassment as sex discrimination,
sent a clear message that women were sexual playthings, rather than competent, qualified workers.27 Therefore, feminists like Catherine MacKinnon
called for sexual harassment to be legally actionable in order to achieve the
ultimate goal of equality between men and women in the workplace.28
22.
Id.
23.
See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 73 (1986).
See Tomkins v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 422 F. Supp. 553, 556 (D.N.J.
24.
1976); Miller v. Bank of Am., 418 F. Supp. 233, 236 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Williams v. Saxbe,
413 F. Supp. 654, 660-61 (D.D.C. 1976); Come v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161,
163 (D. Ariz. 1975).
25.
See, e.g., Katherine M. Franke, What's Wrong with Sexual Harassment? 49
STAN. L. REv. 691, 703-04 (1997) (discussing different feminist perspectives on "ways to
understand sexual harassment as more than harmless conduct"); see also LIN FARLEY,
SEXUAL SHAKEDOWN: THE SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WOMEN ON THE JOB 15 (1978) (arguing
that all forms of sexual harassment contribute to the ultimate goal of keeping women subordinate in the workplace); ROSABETH Moss KANTER, MEN AND WOMEN OF THE CORPORATION
18-27 (1977) (arguing that the feminization of clerical jobs and the growth of a masculine
ethic in management allows men to maintain their dominant status in corporate culture).
26.
See FARLEY, supra note 25.
See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, Title VII and the Complex Female Subject, 92 MICH.
27.
L. REv. 2479, 2497 (1994) ("[S]exual harassment, characterizes discrimination as the devaluative sexualization or derogation of women in the workplace. Whether employers are
expressing overt hostility or manifesting 'sex role spillover,' harassment characterizes
women primarily as sexual objects.., rather than as competent workers.").
CATHERINE MACKiNNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE
28.
OF SEX DISCRIMINATION 32 (Yale Fastback Series 1979) (arguing that sexual harassment

stemmed from the problem of sex-based power). In one of the first cases to recognize that
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This theoretical framework was eventually recognized by courts and
articulated by the EEOC.29 In 1986, the United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of sexual harassment in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v.
Vinsoh,3° concluding that "when a supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate because of the subordinate's sex, that supervisor 'discriminate[s]' on
the basis of sex."'', The Court also recognized that there are two forms of
sexual harassment: quid pro quo and hostile work environment. 32 Quid pro
quo sexual harassment occurs when an employer gives some type of economic benefit to an employee in exchange for sexual acts.33 Under a hostile
work environment theory, a plaintiff may sue an employer because of severe and abusive harassment that unreasonably interferes with plaintiffs
work performance or creates an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work
environment.34 In 1990, the EEOC regulations added sexual harassment as
a form of sex discrimination.3 5
The recognition of sexual harassment as a form of sex discrimination
was followed by an immense amount of litigation in which courts were
forced to define what exactly rose to the level of sexual harassment. 36 More
specifically, courts attempted to determine what constitutes a hostile work
environment. Different courts have taken different approaches.37 It was in
the courts' grappling with this issue, and in the different approaches that
ensued, that sexual favoritism was born as a legal theory.

sexual harassment is cognizable under Title VII, the court held that "the conduct of the
plaintiffs supervisor created an artificial barrier to employment which was placed before
one gender and not the other, despite the fact that both genders were similarly situated."
Williams, 413 F. Supp. at 657-58.
29. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 l(a)(1)-(3) (1980). The EEOC added regulations embodying
the notion of quid pro quo and hostile work environment sexual harassment as a violation of
Title VII. Id.; see also Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 908-09 n.18 (11th Cir.
1982).
30.
477 U.S. 57 (1986).
31.
Id. at64.
32. Id. at 65, 73.
33. Id.at 65.
34.
29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 l(a) (1980).
35. Id. ("Harassment on the basis of sex is a violation of section 703 of Title VII.").
36.
See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72. The Supreme Court ruled on the issue, which is
evidence of the fact that this specific issue has been widely litigated and discussed.
37.
Compare Miller v. Dep't of Corr., 115 P.3d 77, 88 (Cal. 2005) (stating that the
severity element in a hostile work environment case should not be defined narrowly; rather,
all surrounding circumstances should be considered and should be judged by a reasonable
person in the plaintiff's postition), with Whittaker v. N. Ill. Univ., 424 F.3d 640, 645 (7th
Cir. 2005) (reaffirming that the only actionable hostile work environment case is one where
the workplace is "hellish").
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B. EMERGENCE OF SEXUAL FAVORITISM

In general, sexual favoritism occurs when an employee receives a
benefit for being sexually involved with a superior employee or employer.38
The potential cause of action is brought by an employee who is just as
qualified or more qualified as the employee receiving sexual favoritism.
The employee who brings the claim seeks redress for denial of benefits
when denial of said benefits is caused because she was not having sex with
her superiors. 39 Sexual favoritism is different from sexual harassment because the potential plaintiff will not have been a target of sexual harassment
or in a consensual sexual relationship.4 °
However, sexual favoritism and sexual harassment share similar characteristics and effects. Sexual favoritism was traditionally thought of as
dependent upon sexual harassment law because it can potentially create the
same work atmosphere that sexual harassment law seeks to eliminate. 4' For
example, if favoritism is based upon the widespread granting of sexual favors in a workplace, then a "message is implicitly conveyed that the managers view women as 'sexual playthings,' thereby creating an atmosphere
that is demeaning to women. ''42 In Section I, it was noted that the Supreme
Court recognized sexual harassment claims, starting with Meritor Savings
Bank, in order to diminish the existence of such an atmosphere.43 Professor
Abrams discusses the theories of liability in sex discrimination cases that
courts have recognized. In her article, Title VII and the Complex Female
Subject,44 Abrams writes: "Sexual harassment, characterizes discrimination
as the devaluative sexualization or derogation of women in the workplace.
Whether employers are expressing overt hostility or manifesting 'sex role
spillover' harassment characterizes women primarily as sexual objects...
rather than as competent workers., 45 Engaging in widespread sexual favoritism characterizes women as sexual objects as well. For example, a woman
is repeatedly passed-up for a promotion while her female co-workers receive promotions because they had sexual relationships with their boss.
This type of widespread favoritism may communicate the message that the
way for women to get ahead in the workplace is to engage in sexual con38.
Sheridan, supra note 2, at 383.
Id.
39.
40.
EEOC POLICY GUIDANCE, supra note 1.
Id. The Guidelines state that a person may have a claim of sexual favoritism if
41.
there is evidence of quid pro quo or hostile work environment sexual harassment Id. Implicitly, this means that favoritism is dependent on whether or not sexual harassment is present.
Id.
42.
Miller, 115 P.3d at 87 (citing EEOC guideline policy).
43.
Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 497 U.S. 57 (1986).
Abrams, supra note 27, at 2497.
44.
Id.
45.
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duct or that sexual solicitations are a prerequisite to their fair treatment.
This type of situation, therefore, may constitute a hostile work environment
and the women who are not promoted may have a claim of widespread favoritism. 47 Sexual favoritism employs the same ideologies as sexual harassment-ideologies that should not show their effects in the workplace.48
Therefore, because it was observed that widespread favoritism and
hostile work environment could potentially lead to the same negative workplace environment,4 9 the emergence of sexual favoritism appeared as a form
of sexual harassment, which was litigated mostly under the theory of a hostile work environment. ° In 1980, the EEOC guidelines categorized sexual
favoritism as a practice that should be governed by Title VII.5L The guidelines stated:
Where employment opportunities or benefits are granted
because of an individual's submission to the employer's
sexual advances or requests for sexual favors, the employer
may be held liable for unlawful discrimination against
other persons who were qualified for but denied that employment opportunity or benefit.5 2
Between 1980 and 1990, there were only six reported cases involving
sexual favoritism. 53 Of the six reported cases, four courts found that sexual
favoritism was a cause of action under Title VII and two did not. 54 The
courts in Toscano v. Nimmo, Priest v. Rotary, and Broderick v. Ruder
46. EEOC POLICY GUIDANCE, supra note 1.
47. Id.
Toscano v. Nimmo, 570 F. Supp. 1197, 1199 (D. Del. 1983) (recognizing sexual
48.
favoritism as a cause of action under Title VII and noting that even though the facts were not
the "typical" Title VII sexual harassment case, it was "no different in its theoretical underpinnings").
49. EEOC POLICY GUIDANCE, supra note 1.
See generally DeCintio v. Westchester County Med. Ctr., 807 F.2d 304 (2d Cir.
50.
1986); Broderick v. Ruder, 685 F. Supp. 1269 (D.D.C. 1988); Priest v. Rotary, 634 F. Supp.
571 (N.D. Cal. 1986); Miller v. Dep't of Corr., 577 P.3d 77 (Cal. 2005).
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(g) (1980); see also Joan E. Van Tol, Eros Gone Awry:
51.
Liability Under Title VII for Workplace Sexual Favoritism, 13 INDUS. REL. L.J. 153, 167
(1992).
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (g) (1980).
52.
53.
DeCintio, 807 F.2d at 304; Miller v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 679 F. Supp. 495
(W.D. Pa. 1988); Broderick, 685 F. Supp. at 1269; Priest, 634 F. Supp. at 571; King v.
Palmer, 598 F. Supp. 65 (D.D.C. 1984); Toscano, 570 F. Supp. at 1197; see also Van Tol
supra note 51, at 167.
54. DeCintio, 807 F.2d at 304 (rejecting a cause of action for isolated instances of
sexual favoritism); Miller, 679 F. Supp. at 495 (rejecting a cause of action for isolated instances of sexual favoritism); Broderick, 685 F. Supp. at 1269; Priest, 634 F. Supp at 571;
King, 598 F. Supp. at 65; Toscano, 570 F. Supp. at 1197.
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55
treated sexual favoritism claims much like sexual harassment claims.
These courts all found in favor of plaintiffs who claimed sexual favoritism
by determining, in some form or another, that an employer who favored an
employee because of their sexual relationship contributed to a hostile work
environment.56
In Priest,the court noted that:

Title VII is also violated when an employer affords preferential treatment to female employees who submit to his
sexual advances or other conduct of a sexual nature, or
when, by his conduct or statements, implies that job benefits will be conditioned on an employee's good-natured endurance57of his sexually-charged conduct or sexual advances.
In Broderick, the court ruled that "Title VII is also violated when an
employer affords preferential treatment to female employees who submit to
sexual advances or other conduct of a sexual nature. 58 Further, the court
held that "consensual sexual relations, in exchange for tangible employment
benefits, while possibly not creating a cause of action for the recipient of
such sexual advances who does not find them unwelcome, do, and in this
case did, create and contribute to a sexually hostile working environment. ,, 59
In Toscano, the court noted that although the facts were slightly different from a typical sexual harassment case, it was "no different in its theoretical underpinnings.,, 60 All of these cases are evidence of the fact that at
its birth, sexual favoritism was argued using the theory of sexual harassment under Title VII.
By contrast, in DeCintio v Westchester County Medical Center6 ' and
Miller v. Aluminum Co. of America,62 neither court found sexual favoritism

55.
F. Supp. at
56.
F. Supp. at
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

See Broderick, 685 F. Supp. at 1280; Priest, 634 F. Supp. at 571; Toscano, 570
1197.
See Broderick,685 F. Supp. at 1280; Priest,634 F. Supp. at 571; Toscano, 570
1197.
Priest,634 F. Supp. at 581.
Broderick,685 F. Supp. at 1277.
Id.at 1280.
Toscano v. Nimmo, 570 F. Supp. 1197, 1199 (D. Del. 1983).
DeCintio v. Westchester County. Med. Ctr., 807 F.2d 304, 308 (2d Cir. 1986).
Miller v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 679 F. Supp. 495,495 (W.D. Pa. 1988).
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as a cause of action under Title VII. 63 The courts' reasoning in both cases
64
was relied upon in more recent opinions by courts and by the EEOC.
In DeCintio, the district court ruled that the plaintiffs, seven males
who were passed up for promotion in favor of a female employee who had
a sexual relationship with the employer, had a cause of action under Title
VII. 65 However, the Second Circuit reversed this decision and ruled that
Title VII does not encompass the situation of a romantic relationship between an employer and a person preferentially hired. 66 The court was concerned with the possibility
of the EEOC and the federal courts policing in67
timate relationships.
The facts in DeCintio were similar to the facts in Miller. In Miller, an
employee alleged that her supervisor treated her less favorably than her
female co-worker, who was having a romantic relationship with their supervisor.6 8 The court came to the same conclusion as the court in DeCintio,
69
ruling that Title VII does not protect this type of sexual favoritism.
DeCintio and Miller exemplify courts' reluctance to identify isolated instances of sexual favoritism as a brand of sexual favoritism banned by Title
VII.
Following these six initial cases, there began a trend among courts to
recognize and permit a remedy for claims of widespread sexual favoritism
under a hostile work environment but not to give credence to claims involving isolated sexual favoritism. 70 In 2005, the California Supreme Court, in
Miller v. Department of Corrections,7 1 would be the first to decide in express terms that widespread sexual favoritism may be actionable under a
hostile work environment theory.72
C. MILLER V DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

In Miller, the warden of a prison gave preferential treatment to three
employees with whom he was having sexual relations.73 The warden
granted promotions to these three women when others on the promotion
63. DeCintio, 807 F.2d at 308; Miller, 679 F. Supp. at 500-01.
64. See EEOC POLICY GUIDANCE, supra note 1 (noting that isolated instances of
sexual favoritism are not prohibited under Title VII).
65. DeCintio, 807 F.2d at 306.
66. Id. at 308.
67. Id.
68. Miller, 679 F. Supp. at 500-01.
69. Id.
70. See, e.g., DeCintio, 807 F.2d at 308; Miller, 679 F. Supp. at 501; see also EEOC
POLICY GUIDANCE, supra note 1.
71.
Miller v. Dep't of Corr., 115 P.3d 77, 90 (Cal. 2005).
72. Id.
73.
Id. at 81-84.
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committee had not recommended such promotions. 74 The warden was affectionate with them in the workplace, and the girlfriends would often fight
with one another for his attention.75 Further, the three women would often
brag about their relationships with the warden to other employees. 76 The
court found that the plaintiff had a valid widespread sexual favoritism
claim.7 7 Under this set of facts, the plaintiff, who was not one of the three
women engaging in sexual conduct with the warden, demonstrated that the
sexual favoritism in her workplace was widespread and that she was forced
to work in a severe and pervasive hostile work environment, which constituted sexual harassment.78 However, in reaching its conclusion, the court
noted that sexual favoritism towards a girlfriend or boyfriend is not actionable as sexual harassment. 79 The court reaffirmed the EEOC's interpretation
of Title VII as applied to widespread and isolated instances of sexual favoritism: widespread sexual favoritism may be actionable under Title VII;
whereas, isolated instances of sexual favoritism are not.80
In Miller, the California Supreme Court found that a third-party employee had a cause of action under the theory of hostile work environment
when his or her employer engaged in widespread sexual favoritism.81 However, the issue the court addressed was "whether a prima facie case of sexual harassment was established under the California Fair Employment and
Housing Act." 82 Even though this case was highly significant regarding the
future recognition of widespread sexual favoritism as a legal cause of action, it was governed by state law, not the federal law of Title VII.83 Therefore, on the particular issue of third-party employees in widespread sexual
the federal circuits and most state courts
favoritism, the common law of
84
undecided.
not
if
split,
remains
74.
Id.
75.
Id.at 83-84.
76.
Miller, 115 P.3d at 83-84.
77.
Id.at 80.
Id.
78.
79.
Id.
80.
EEOC POLICY GUIDANCE, supra note 1. A plaintiff may have a claim of widespread sexual favoritism but will not when there is only evidence of an isolated instance of
sexual favoritism. Id.
81.
Miller, 115 P.3d at 80.
82.
Id.
83.
Id.at 77.
84.
Id.; see also McGinnis v. Union Pac. R.R., 496 F.3d 868, 874 (8th Cir. 2007);
Tenge v. Phillips Modem Ag Co., 446 F.3d 903, 908 (8th Cir. 2006); Bartniak v. Cushman
& Wakefield, Inc., 223 F. Supp. 2d 524, 531-532 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); Bonnor v. Guccione, 916
F. Supp. 271, 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). Some cases address the issue of an isolated instance of
sexual favoritism but do not address the issue of whether widespread favoritism would be a
cause of action. See, e.g., Riggs v. County of Banner, 159 F. Supp. 2d 1158 (D. Neb. 2001);
Harvey v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 961 F. Supp. 1017, 1029 (S.D. Tex. 1997).
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III. ARGUMENT
A.

SEVENTH CIRCUIT: SEXUAL FAVORITISM & HOSTILE WORK
ENVIRONMENT

Some courts have recognized that widespread sexual favoritism constitutes a cause of action under the hostile work environment theory.8 5 However, the Seventh Circuit has not adopted this view.86 The Seventh Circuit
has also denied any claim based on facts alleging an isolated sexual relationship.8 7 Therefore, as it stands, a party who suffers from either widespread or isolated sexual favoritism in the Seventh Circuit has no legal recourse under Title VII. 88 Parties who seek redress for sexual favoritism
Circuit fail due to
under a hostile work environment theory in the Seventh
89
environment.,
work
"hostile
of
definition
court's
the
To prevail on a claim of hostile work environment in the Seventh Circuit, a plaintiff must show the following:
(1) she was subjected to unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors or other verbal or physical conduct
of a sexual nature; (2) the conduct was severe or pervasive
enough to create a hostile work environment; (3) the conduct was directed at her because of her sex; and (4) there is
a basis for liability. 90
The court's requirement that "the conduct was severe" 9' is difficult to
prove, because the court has set the severity requirement at a very high
standard, concluding that the workplace must be "hellish" to be actionable. 92 The question then becomes, what is "hellish"? 93 Different factors
that are considered include the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its
See Bonnor v. Guccione, 916 F. Supp. 271, 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
85.
Rhodes v. 11.Dep't of Transp., 359 F.3d 498, 505 (7th Cir. 2004) (citing Hall v.
86.
Bodine Elec. Co., 276 F.3d 345, 355 (7th Cir. 2002)). The Seventh Circuit finds that to prevail on a claim of hostile work environment, an employee must show that: "she was subjected to unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors or other verbal or physical
conduct of a sexual nature." Id. In other words, a plaintiff arguing a hostile work environment claim must have been targeted with some type of sexual harassment. See id.
Schobert v. Ill. Dep't of Transp., 304 F.3d 725, 733 (7th Cir. 2002) (stating that
87.
consensual relationships, i.e., isolated sexual relationships, resulting in favoritism are not in
violation of Title VII and that in non-consensual relationships, only the target of the harassment has a claim of sex discrimination).
88. Id; see also Rhodes, 359 F.3d at 505.
Whittaker v. N. I11.Univ., 424 F.3d 640, 645 (7th Cir. 2005).
89.
Rhodes, 359 F.3d at 505.
90.
Id.
91.
92.
93.

Whittaker, 424 F.3d at 645.
Id.
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severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance. 94 This does not answer our question of what a
"hellish" workplace is. 95 Instead, it begs further questions, like what constitutes severe humiliation?
In Weiss v. Coca-ColaBottling Co. of Chicago, the court held that the
plaintiff failed to show that the conduct was severe and pervasive. 96 Weiss's
supervisors consistently asked her out on dates (which were each followed
by rejections), repeatedly called her a "dumb blond," put their hands on her
shoulders at least six times, placed "I love you" signs in her workplace, and
tried to kiss her on multiple occasions.9 7 In Koelsch v. Beltone Electronics
Corp., the plaintiff failed to show severe conduct when the company's
president stroked plaintiffs leg with his foot, "grabbed her bottom," and
made other unwanted sexual advances.98 In Saxton v. American Telephone
& Telegraph Co., the plaintiff failed in claiming a hostile work environment even though her supervisor repeatedly suggestively touched her and
kissed her.99 These decisions illustrate the Seventh Circuit's high standard,
which make it difficult for a victim of direct sexual harassment to prove the
"hellish" work environment necessary to bring a sexual harassment claim.
If it is hard for a victim who is directly sexually harassed, it follows that it
would be nearly impossible for a third-party to claim sexual favoritism under the sexual harassment theory of hostile work environment. 00 As a result, widespread sexual favoritism, if argued under a hostile work environment theory, presently leaves plaintiffs with no legal recourse in the Seventh Circuit because (1) the court has already stated that they will not recognize widespread sexual favoritism as constituting a hostile work environment, 10 and (2) even if the court did recognize widespread favoritism as
would still
a hostile work environment on a theoretical basis, claimants
02
have a burden that is pragmatically impossible to meet.1

94.
Bazile v. Ford Motor Co., 960 F. Supp. 1332, 1335 (N.D. I11.1997).
95.
Whittaker, 424 F.3d at 645.
96.
990 F.2d 333, 337 (7th Cir. 1993).
97.
Id.
98.
46 F.3d 705, 708 (7th Cir. 1995).
99.
10 F.3d 526, 534-35 (7thCir. 1993).
100.
See, e.g., Rhodes v. Ill. Dep't. of Transp., 359 F.3d 498, 505 (7th Cir. 2004).
101.
Id. (citing Hall v. Bodine Elec. Co., 276 F.3d 345, 355 (7th Cir. 2002)). The
Seventh Circuit finds that to prevail on a claim of hostile work environment, an employee
must show that: "she was subjected to unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual
favors or other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature." Id. In other words, a plaintiff
arguing a hostile work environment claim must have been targeted with some type of sexual
harassment. See id.
102.
Whittaker v. N. Ill. Univ., 424 F.3d 640, 645 (7th Cir. 2005).
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B. ISOLATED INSTANCES OF SEXUAL FAVORITISM

As discussed, there is a split among the federal circuits on whether
widespread sexual favoritism is a cause of action under the hostile work
environment theory of sexual harassment. 10 3 However, there is little disagreement among courts regarding isolated instances of sexual favoritism.1°4 The EEOC Guidelines state: "Title VII does not prohibit isolated
instances of preferential treatment based upon consensual romantic relationships." 10 5 The majority of courts cite this provision of the Guidelines to
support the rule that isolated instances of sexual favoritism between two
consensual partners is not prohibited.' 0 6 The EEOC Guidelines, however,
lack the force of law, 10 7 meaning that courts are not bound by the EEOC
Guidelines. The EEOC Guidelines are "entitled to respect," but courts certainly have the power to disregard the Guidelines. 0 8 Even so, the majority
of courts have taken the position that isolated instances of sexual favoritism
are not actionable. 10 9
The main argument as to why isolated instances of sexual favoritism
are not prohibited is that the alleged discrimination is not based on the
plaintiffs gender."0 The argument unfolds as follows: "An isolated instance of favoritism toward a 'paramour' may be unfair, but it does not discriminate against women or men . . . since both are disadvantaged for reasons other than their genders.""' Moreover, "a female [plaintiff] who is
denied an employment benefit because of such sexual favoritism would not
have been treated more favorably had she been a man nor, conversely, was
she treated less favorably because she was a woman."'" 12 As noted previously, when sexual harassment cases were first being tried, courts were
reluctant to say that sexual harassment was discrimination on the basis of
103.
CompareMiller v. Dep't of Corr., 115 P.3d 77, 90 (Cal. 2005) (recognizing that
widespread sexual favoritism can be sexual harassment under a hostile work environment),
with Hall v. Bodine Elec. Co., 276 F.3d 345, 355 (7th Cir. 2002) (affirming that a plaintiff
must have been personally sexually harassed in order to bring a hostile work environment
claim).
104. See, e.g., McGinnis v. Union Pac. R.R., 496 F.3d 868, 874 (8th Cir. 2007);
Tenge v. Phillips Modem Ag Co., 446 F.3d 903, 908 (8th Cir. 2006); Schobert v. I11.
Dep't
of Transp., 304 F.3d 725, 733 (7th Cir. 2002).
105. EEOC POLICY GUIDANCE, supra note 1.
106.
See, e.g., McGinnis, 496 F.3d at 874; Tenge, 446 F.3d at 908; Schobert, 304
F.3d at 733; Harvey v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 961 F. Supp. 1017, 1029 (S.D. Tex. 1997).
107.
Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000).
108.
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
109.
See, e.g., Harvey, 961 F. Supp. at 1029.
110.
EEOC POLICY GUIDANCE, supranote 1.
111.
Id.
112. Id.
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sex. 113 Courts relied on the reasoning that both males and females could
potentially be victims of sexual harassment."l 4 This is the same argument
being made against isolated instances of sexual favoritism. 15 However, this
is no longer a valid legal argument for sexual harassment cases. It is now
recognized that when a supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate, it is because of the subordinate's sex and, therefore, discrimination based on
sex. 116 In other words, but for the employee's sex, the employer would not
have sexually harassed her." 7
By applying this same reasoning to isolated instances of sexual favoritism, it is clear that but for the employee's sex, the employer would not
have had a sexual relationship with that employee. Therefore, it is sex discrimination if that employer gives employment benefits to that employee
solely because of their sexual relationship. The old and invalidated legal
reasoning that sexual harassment is not sex discrimination should not now
be considered valid when applied to isolated instances of sexual favoritism. 118

Further, the EEOC states that "[i]f a female employee is coerced into
submitting to unwelcome sexual advances in return for a job benefit, other
female employees who were qualified for but were denied the benefit may
be able to establish" a claim of favoritism based upon coerced sexual conduct." 9 Under these circumstances, the same argument against isolated instances of sexual favoritism applies. A female employee who was denied
the employment benefit would not have been treated more favorably had
she been a man. 120 This is evidence of the fact that in both casesconsensual instances and coerced instances of sexual relationships-the
legal reasoning is the same. But for the employee's sex, the employer
would not have had consensual or coerced sexual relations with that emcoercedfavoritism;
sexual relationship,
instance
ployee.
122
but in an-a
a claimofofa sexual
employee in
mayonehave
third-party However,
113. See Tomkins v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 422 F. Supp. 553, 556 (D.N.J.
1976); Miller v. Bank of Am., 418 F. Supp. 233 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F.
Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976); Come v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161 (D. Ariz. 1975);
Barnes v. Train, Civil Action No. 1828-73 (D.D.C. 1974).
114.

E.g., Tomkins, 422 F. Supp. at 556.

119.

EEOC POLICY GUIDANCE, supra note 1.

EEOC POLICY GUIDANCE, supra note 1.
Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986).
116.
117.
Id.
118.
Id. (recognizing that sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination). Old
legal arguments against sexual harassment have been rejected and, therefore, should not be
applied to sexual favoritism when the issue is still employers targeting a particular sex.
115.

120.
121.
122.

See Phillips, supra note 13, at 579.
Id.
EEOC POLICY GUIDANCE, supra note 1.
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other instance of a consensual sexual relationship, a third-party employee
will not have a claim of sexual favoritism. 123 In other words, as it stands
now, there must be evidence of sexual harassment between the two involved in a sexual relationship in order for a third-party employee to claim
124
sexual favoritism.

If an employee is injured as a third-party by a sexual relationship, that
employee's right to a remedy should not rest on the consensual nature of
said sexual relationship. Consensual or not, but for that employee's sex, the
employer would not have engaged in a sexual relationship. Consensual or
not, but for the sexual relationship, the employee would not have received
employment benefits. 25 If this is the case, a third-party employee should
have a claim without the consensual nature of the sexual relationship ever
becoming a factor.
Coercion is a very important element of sexual harassment. If a
woman consents, then there is no harassment.126 However, in sexual favoritism claims, the issue should not be whether the female employee was coerced into or consented to the sexual relationship. Rather, the issue should
be whether the employee is receiving employment benefits solely because
of the sexual relationship. If benefits are given solely because of a sexual
relationship, then the employee is receiving benefits because of her sex, in
addition to the sexual acts. If sexual favoritism is accepted under the legal
theory of sex-plus, this is sex discrimination.127 The purpose of sexual favoritism cases is to eliminate an individual's opportunity to use his or her
sexuality for the purpose of gaining employment benefits. In order to accomplish this, the threshold issue of sexual favoritism claims must be
whether or not an employee is receiving employment benefits solely be28
cause of certain sexual acts. 1

123. Id.
124. Id. Coerced sexual relationship exemplifies a quid pro quo sexual harassment
situation and therefore, sexual favoritism may be present and actionable. Id. Widespread
sexual favoritism may constitute a hostile work environment under sexual harassment. Id.
125. See Phillips, supra note 13, at 579; Mary C. Manemann, Comment, The Meaning of Sex in Title VII: Is Favoringan Employee Lover a Violation of the Act?, 83 Nw. U. L.
REv. 612, 614 (1989).
126. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (a) (1980); see also Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477
U.S. 57, 65 (1986).
127. See Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971) (recognizing
sex-plus discrimination as a form of sex discrimination for purposes of Title VII). In this
case, the "plus" was having pre-school-age children. Id.
128. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(2)(a)(1) (1964) (noting that if it can be argued
and proved that an employee is receiving benefits solely because of sexual acts, there is sex
discrimination). But for the employee's sex, there would be no sexual relationship and but
for the sexual relationship there would be no preferential treatment. See id.
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C. SEX-PLUS AS SEX DISCRIMINATION

In Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp.,129 the United States Supreme
Court adopted the proposition that sex considered in conjunction with a
second characteristic-sex-plus--can delineate a 'protected group' and can
therefore serve as a basis for a Title VII suit. 130 The defendant in Phillips
refused to hire women with children in pre-school but hired men in that
same situation.13 1 The district court found that at the time Mrs. Phillips applied, seventy-five to eighty percent of those hired for the position were
women. 32 This indicates that there was no real question of any general bias
against hiring women. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court held that "permitting one hiring policy for women and another for men-each having preschool-age children," violated Title VII. 133 Other characteristics that have
134
been recognized by courts under the sex-plus doctrine are: sex plus child,
sex plus marriage, 135 sex plus fertility, 136 sex plus gender stereotypes, 137 and
or
sex plus pregnancy. 138 Gender-neutral characteristics (e.g., child rearing 139
doctrine.
sex-plus
under
factor
"plus"
a
considered
be
not
will
child care)
been used as a "plus" characterisSexual relationships have not specifically 140
tic, though "personal relationships" have.
In Coleman v B-G Maintenance Management of Colorado, Inc., the
plaintiff claimed that she was discriminated against because of her gender
and her personal relationship. 141 She was not successful because, in contrast
to Phillips,142 there was no corresponding subclass of men-that is, men 1in
43
a "personal relationship" or common law marriage with the defendant.
The court concluded that in order to show discrimination on the basis of
gender in conjunction with a personal relationship, the plaintiff must show
129.
400 U.S. at 542.
130.
Id. at 544.
131.
Id. at 543.
132.
Id.
133.
Id. at 544.
134.
Phillips, 400 U.S. at 544.
135.
Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1196 (7th Cir. 1971).
136.
Int'l Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 187 (1991).
137.
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 229 (1989).
138.
Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 669
(1983).
139.
See Guglietta v. Meredith Corp., 301 F. Supp. 2d 209, 214 (D. Conn. 2004).
140.
Coleman v. B-G Maint. Mgmt. of Colo., Inc., 108 F.3d 1199, 1203 n.1 (10th
Cir. 1997) (noting the plaintiff has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence
that the defendant's actions were motivated by the plaintiff's gender or gender along with
her personal relationship with the defendant).
141.
Id.
Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971).
142.
143.
Coleman, 108 F.3d at 1203-04.
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that she was treated less favorably in comparison to similarly situated persons of the opposite sex.144
As shown in Phillips and Coleman, an important element in sex-plus
claims is deciding which two groups of individuals will be compared in
determining whether or not there was indeed sex discrimination. 145 In Phillips, the sex discrimination between men and women was not based solely
on their gender. 46 The discrimination occurred between women with preschool children and men with pre-school children. 47 However, there is a
split in the federal circuits on what the appropriate comparison is in sexplus claims.148 The debate "over whether the proper comparator may only
include a person outside of the protected class who has the same 'plus characteristic' as the plaintiff ... or whether the comparator may include any
person (male or female) who lacks the 'plus' characteristic" has sparked
controversy. 149 For example, does a woman with young children (claiming
sex plus child), have to prove that she was treated less favorably than a man
with small children, 5 ° or does she have to prove that people, male or female, without children were treated more favorably?' 5' With regards to
sexual favoritism, the ability to state a cause of action under sex-plus discrimination depends on which comparison a court chooses to use. However,
under both approaches a sexual favoritism claim is possible.
1.

ComparisonApproach: PlaintiffMust Show that She Was Treated
Less Favorablythan Similarly-SituatedMen

First, it is important to reiterate that bringing a sex-plus claim means
that an individual's sex is considered in conjunction with a second characteristic. 52 In other words, a person is discriminated against not solely be144. Id.
145.
Phillips, 400 U.S. at 544.
146. Id.
147.
Id.
148.
Compare Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107 (2d
Cir. 2004) (rejecting the notion that women plaintiffs must show that they were treated differently than similarly-situated men in order to survive summary judgment), with Coleman
v. B-G Maint. Mgmt. of Colo. Inc., 108 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 1997) (requiring that women
plaintiffs show that they were treated differently than similarly-situated men).
149.
Philipsen v. Univ. of Mich. Bd. of Regents, No. 06-CV-1 1977-DT, 2007 WL
907822, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 22, 2007). Compare Back, 365 F.3d at 107 (rejecting the
notion that women plaintiffs must show that they were treated differently than similarlysituated men in order to survive summary judgment), with Coleman, 108 F.3d at 1199 (requiring that women plaintiffs show that they were treated differently than similarly-situated
men).
150.
Phillips,400 U.S. at 544.
151.
Id.
152.
Id.
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cause of his or her gender, but because of his or her gender along with
something else (e.g., marriage). 53 A female victim of sexual favoritism
using a sex-plus argument would be claiming that she was discriminated
against because of her sex and a sexual relationship. 5 4 When a sexual relationship is the 'plus' factor, the plaintiff will actually be arguing that she
was discriminated against because of her sex and her lack of the plus factor,
i.e., the sexual relationship. Therefore, under this first comparison approach, the comparison would be between women who lack the plus characteristic and men who lack the plus characteristic.' 55
Recall the hypothetical presented at the beginning of this Comment
involving Jane and Sally. However, add Graham to the equation. Graham
and Jane have the same qualifications and Sally has substantially lower
qualifications than both Graham and Jane. There is direct evidence that
Sally is having consensual sexual intercourse with Joe, the boss of all three
employees. Graham and Sally get promotions. Jane does not. Here, both
Graham and Jane are similarly situated because they both lack the 'plus'
characteristic (the sexual relationship) and are treated differently because
Graham got the promotion and Jane did not. So, women who do not have a
sexual relationship with the boss are being treated less favorably than men
who do not have a sexual relationship with the boss. Assuming that Jane is
able to prove that Joe's motivating factor in promoting Sally was the sexual
relationship, she should have a valid cause of action. 56 However, what if
both Graham and Jane were not promoted? Graham may have a claim of
sex discrimination if he is able to prove that gender was the motivating factor in promoting Sally.' 57 Jane, on the other hand, would not have a claim if
the court adopted the first comparison approach-requiring Jane to show
that she was treated less favorably than similarly situated persons of the
153.
Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1197-98 (7th Cir. 1971)
("[A]n employer's rule which forbids or restricts the employment of married women and
which is not applicable to married men is a discrimination based on sex prohibited by Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act.").
154.
See generally Phillips, 400 U.S. at 544 (recognizing the "sex-plus" theory as a
cause of action for victims of sexual favoritism).
See Coleman v. B-G Maint. Mgmt. of Colo. Inc., 108 F.3d 1199, 1203 (10th
155.
Cir. 1997) ("[A]lthough the protected class need not include all women, the plaintiff must
still prove that the subclass of women was unfavorably treated as compared to the corresponding subclass of men.").
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (1991) ("Except as otherwise provided in this subchap156.
ter, an unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice."). In a sexual favoritism claim, the plaintiff would have the burden of proving that the employer's actions
were motivated by another employee's gender and his or her sexual relationship with that
employee. See id.
157.
Id.
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opposite sex (Graham).158 For this reason, the comparison approach adopted
by the court in Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free School District
would be more favorable to a plaintiff arguing sexual favoritism under the
sex-plus doctrine.' 59
2.

ComparisonApproach: PlaintiffMust Show that She Was Treated
Differently than Anyone Who Has or Lacks the "Plus Characteristic"

The comparison used in Back is between the plaintiff and all other persons, male or female, who lack the "plus" characteristic. 160 The court states,
"In [sex-plus] cases the employer does not discriminate against a class of
men or women as a whole but rather treats differently a subclass of men or
women."' 16 1 According to the court in Back, the relevant issue is whether a
subclass of people is being treated differently than the non-subclass of individuals. 62 In Back, the defendants were "wrong in their contention that
Back cannot make out a claim that survives summary judgment unless she
demonstrates that the defendants treated similarly situated men differently.'

63

Although the case may be stronger with such evidence, "there is

no requirement that such evidence be adduced."' 164 "In determining whether
an employee has been discriminated against 'because of such individual's.
• .sex,' the courts have consistently emphasized that the ultimate issue is
the reasons for the individualplaintiff's treatment,
not the relative treatment
65
of different groups within the workplace."1
Applying a claim of the sexual favoritism to the approach adopted in
Back, the question becomes: is the plaintiff being treated less favorably in
comparison to the individual(s) having the sexual relationship with the
boss? This is a more rational and logical comparison because this is the
essence of sexual favoritism-the plus characteristic. It allows courts to
focus on the ultimate66 issue: the motivating reasons behind the individual
plaintiffs treatment.

By using this second comparison approach, a plaintiff arguing sexual
favoritism would have to show that she is being treated less favorably in
comparison to the individual(s) having the sexual relationship with the
158.

159.
2004).
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

See Coleman, 108 F.3d at 1203.

Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107 (2d Cir.

Id.
Id.at 119 n.7.
Id.at 119.
Id.at 121.
Back, 365 F.3d at 121.
Id.
(citing Brown v. Henderson, 257 F.3d 246, 252 (2d Cir. 2001)).
Id.
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boss. Going back to the hypothetical, Jane would have to show that she was
treated less favorably because of her sex in conjunction with not having a
sexual relationship with Joe, the boss. The comparison would be between
Jane and Sally. This type of comparison is more appropriate because it allows courts to focus on the ultimate issue-"the reasons for the individual
plaintiff's treatment, not the relative treatment of different groups within
the work place.' 67 In other words, the issue that should be focused on is
why Jane, who lacks the plus characteristic, was treated less favorably than
Sally who does have the plus characteristic. This type of comparison approach is more favorable to a person arguing that they were discriminated
against because of their sex plus a sexual relationship because it eliminates
the situation, outlined above, in which Jane is left with no cause of action.
When an employee is receiving employment benefits solely because
she is having a sexual relationship with the boss, third-parties, who are being denied benefits, must have a legal remedy because: (1) but for the gender of the employee who is receiving benefits, the employer would not have
had a sexual relationship with her;168 and (2) but for the sexual relationship,
the employer would not have given her employment benefits. 169 This is
sexual favoritism and, under a sex-plus legal argument, discrimination on
the basis of sex. 70 Therefore, the second approach makes it easier for Jane
to bring an actionable claim of sexual favoritism under Title VII.
D.

SIGNIFICANCE OF ARGUING SEXUAL FAVORITISM UNDER SEX-PLUS

Arguing sexual favoritism under the sex-plus theory is significant because it allows plaintiffs to bring a cause of action regardless of whether the
167.

Id.

168.
A Title VII sex discrimination recovery requires "treatment of a person in a
manner which but for that person's sex would be different." City of L.A. Dep't of Water &
Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 711 (1978). The Supreme Court later developed a test for
the determination of the but-for causation:
In determining whether a particular factor was a but-for cause of a given
event, we begin by assuming that that factor was present at the time of
the event, and then ask whether, even if that factor has been absent, the
event nevertheless would have transpired in the same way.
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 240 (1989). A portion of the Price Waterhouse
decision, however, was overtumed by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(2)(m), which states that "an unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates that race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice,
even though other factors also motivated the practice." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(2)(m) (1991).
169.
See, e.g., McGrenaghan v. St. Denis Sch., 979 F. Supp. 323, 327 (E.D. Pa.
1997) ("The rationale behind the 'sex-plus' theory of gender discrimination is to enable Title
VII plaintiffs to survive summary judgment where the employer does not discriminate
against all members of a sex.").
170.
Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971).
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sexual conduct was consensual or not. In other words, the sex-plus theory
gives rise to legal action in isolated instances of sexual favoritism. It is important to keep in mind that how one argues sexual favoritism claims will
depend upon the facts of a particular case. If a situation arises in which the
facts are comparable to those in Miller v. Department of Corrections,7 '
then arguing widespread sexual favoritism under a hostile work environment theory would suffice. However, arguing under the theory of sex-plus
discrimination would cover not only the extreme situation in Miller,72 but
also isolated cases involving individuals who are being denied promotions
for not having sex with his or her superior.
Sexual favoritism under a sex-plus theory would cover both isolated
and widespread sexual favoritism because the ultimate issue for the courts
would be whether the motivating factor in denying one individual a promotion over the other is based on the individual's gender in conjunction with
the sexual relationship. 173 The threshold question for sexual favoritism
would not be whether an individual consented to or was coerced into a sexual relationship; 174 rather, the question would be, were gender and a sexual
relationship the motivating factor in the employer's decision to promote one
employee over the other? 17 When courts focus on the latter issue, there are
three significant effects: (1) it allows victims of isolated sexual favoritism
to potentially have a claim, (2) it maintains the rationale used by courts to
refrain from regulating personal relationships, 176 and (3) it protects the
courts from a flood of meritless lawsuits by limiting the cause of action.
E. SEXUAL FAVORITISM AS SEX-PLUS: A LIMITED CAUSE OF ACTION

Sexual favoritism as a cause of action will be limited because sex-plus
discrimination under Title VII requires a disparate treatment analysis governed by McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green. 177 In McDonnell Douglas,
171.
Miller v. Dep't of Corr., 115 P.3d 77, 81-84 (Cal. 2005). The warden of a prison
gave preferential treatment to three other employees with whom he was having sexual relationships. Id. Promotions were granted to these three women by the warden when others on
the promotion committee had not recommended such promotions. Id. The warden was affectionate with them in the workplace and the girlfriends would often fight with one another. Id.
Further, the three women would often brag about their relationships with the warden to other
employees. Id.
172. Id.
173.
Coleman v. B-G Maint. Mgmt. of Colo. Inc., 108 F.3d 1199, 1203 (10th Cir.
1997).
174.
EEOC POLICY GUIDANCE, supra note 1.
175.
Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971) (validating sex-plus
as being sex discrimination under Title VII).
176.
E.g., DeCintio v. Westchester County Med. Ctr., 807 F.2d 304, 308 (2d Cir.
1986).
177.
411 U.S. 792 (1973).
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the Supreme Court developed a three-tiered burden-shifting framework for
applying § 2000e-2.118 First, the plaintiff must present a prima facie case of
discrimination which must include the following allegations: (1) plaintiff is
a member of a protected class; (2) plaintiff applied for and was qualified for
a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (3) that despite these
qualifications, the employer rejected the plaintiff; and (4) that, after this
rejection, the job remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants having the plaintiff's qualifications. 7 9
If the plaintiff presents a prima facie case, then the burden shifts to the
employer, who is required to demonstrate "some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" for not hiring or promoting the plaintiff.'80 The defendant need
only articulate-but need not prove-the existence of a non-discriminatory
reason.'8 1 In other words, the burden on the defendant is low. If the defendant provides some type of reason, then the plaintiff assumes the burden to
show that the employer's stated reason for the plaintiffs rejection was in
fact merely a pretext. 182 The plaintiff must establish "both
that the reason
' 83
was false, andthat discrimination was the real reason."'
The benefit of arguing sexual favoritism under a sex-plus theory is that
a plaintiff should now be able to make out a prima facie case under the
McDonnell Douglas model. 8 4 Courts that completely reject the notion that
isolated instances of sexual favoritism can be actionable under Title VII
will, in essence, be rejecting the McDonnell Douglas model of a prima facie
case. In our hypothetical, Jane can show that she is within a protected
class (women), her employer was looking to promote someone, she was
186
denied the promotion, and that the promotion was given to someone else.
Therefore, Jane can establish a prima facie case under the McDonnell

178.
Id. at 802.
179.
Id.
180.
Id.
181.
Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254-56 (1981).
182.
McDonnell, 411 U.S. at 804.
183.
St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515 n.4 (1993).
184.
McDonnell, 411 U.S. at 802.
185.
Harvey v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 961 F. Supp. 1017, 1029 (S.D. Tex. 1997)
("Alleged favoritism to a paramour generally has been held not to constitute discrimination
in violation of Title VII because the alleged discrimination is not based on the plaintiffs
gender."); see also McGinnis v. Union Pac. R.R., 496 F.3d 868, 874 (8th Cir. 2007); Tenge
v. Phillips Modem Ag Co., 446 F.3d 903, 908 (8th Cir. 2006); Schobert v. Ill. Dep't of
Transp., 304 F.3d 725, 733 (7th Cir. 2002); Murray v. City of Winston-Salem, 203 F. Supp.
2d 493 (M.D.N.C. 2002); Riggs v. County of Banner, 159 F. Supp. 2d 1158, 1164 (D. Neb.
2001); EEOC POLICY GUIDANCE, supra note 1 (rejecting isolated instances of sexual favoritism as being actionable under Title VII).
186.
McDonnell, 411 U.S. at 802 (outlining the elements needed to create a prima
facie case of discrimination under Title VII).
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Douglas model' 87 However, after the employer states a legitimate reason
for not promoting (or hiring) Jane, 18 8 she has a difficult burden of proof.
There are limited sets of facts in which a plaintiff claiming sexual favoritism will be successful. Jane would have to prove that Joe's reason for not
promoting her was not only false, but also that discrimination was the real
reason. 189 In other words, Jane would have to prove, by a preponderance of
the evidence, that the motivating factor in Joe's decision to deny Jane the
promotion was because of the sexual relationship he was having with
Sally.' 9 Arguably, Jane has a good case. She was more qualified (college
degree in marketing), she had been with the company three years longer
than Sally, she had a higher commission rate by $300,000, and Sally told
Jane she was having a sexual relationship with Joe, which, assuming that
Sally was telling the truth, would be direct evidence that there was indeed a
sexual relationship between Sally and Joe. Jane could use these facts to
overcome the presumption that Joe had legitimate reasons to promote Sally
over her,' 9' and to prove that Joe's actual motivation
in promoting Sally
92
over her was Joe's sexual relationship with Sally.
In our hypothetical, Jane gets her day in court to prove unfair sexual
favoritism if the court applies the sex-plus doctrine. 93 As stated from the
outset, this seems only fair by any reasonable measure of conscience. On
the other hand, we have also seen the rigorous scrutiny the court would give
to these cases in its application of the sex-plus doctrine through the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting model. 194 Jane would need to claim particular
facts to establish a prima facie case, and she would have the difficult task of
overcoming presumptions in favor of the defendant.' 95 Therefore, under
sex-plus, those who deserve their day in court will have it, but those who do
not meet the narrowly-tailored requirements of sex-plus will have their
cases easily disposed of by the court.

187.
188.

Id.
Id.

189.
St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515 n.4 (1993).
190.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(2)(m) (1991) (requiring a plaintiff to prove that sex or
sex-plus was the motivating factor); see also McDonnell, 411 U.S. at 802 (establishing the
required burden-shifting).
191.
Fisher v. Vassar Coll., 70 F.3d 1420, 1433 (2d Cir. 1995); see also McDonnell,
411 U.S. at 802.
192.
St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 509 U.S. at 515.
193.
See generally Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971) (validating a sex-plus theory).
194.
McDonnell, 411 U.S. at 802.
195.
Id.
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IV. CONCLUSION: INCORPORATING A FEMINIST PERSPECTIVE

Allowing the practice of sexual favoritism promotes the idea that
women should use their sexuality as a way to advance themselves in the
workplace. It reinforces many post-feminist ideas that a woman's body can
and should be used as a form of empowerment.1 96 It symbolizes a postfeminist perspective that men and women are now equal, so there is no
harm in a woman using her sexuality to feel empowered and to use it strategically to get what she wants.' 97 Embracing such an attitude allows individuals to look past the ongoing discrimination women still face in the
workplace. It encourages the demeaning viewpoint that women are "sexual
98
playthings," the very stereotype denounced by sexual harassment law. 1
Providing legal redress for sexual favoritism claims under a sex-plus
theory promotes the continuation of a movement away from sex discrimination and inequality in the workplace. Early arguments of sexual favoritism
under theories of sexual harassment were natural starting points. Attacking
sexual favoritism via sexual harassment claims highlighted important characteristics and potential consequences of sexual favoritism; 199 for example,
sexual favoritism can have the same effects as sexual harassment in the
workplace. 200 Therefore, if there are not legal consequences for sexual favoritism, then the attitudes and behaviors that embody sexual harassment
will be reinforced. 20 1 The view of women as "sexual playthings" rather than
competent workers will continue to fester and remain persistent in many
196.
NAOMI WOLF, FIRE WITH FIRE: THE NEW FEMALE POWER AND How IT WILL
CHANGE THE 21ST CENTURY 13 (1993) (arguing that the world has experienced a "gender

quake" of social change and that women are now significantly better off and should embrace
their power to achieve for themselves instead of focusing on what is wrong); see also Karen
Pitcher, The Staging of Agency in Girls Gone Wild, in 23 CRITICAL STUDIES IN MEDIA
COMMUNICATION 200, 212 (2006) (arguing that because women voluntarily choose to be on
Girls Gone Wild, the experience becomes pleasurable, empowering, and liberating because
these women choose to use their sexuality to reap some type of personal benefit).
197.
WOLF, supra note 196, at 15. Naomi Wolf, a proclaimed post-feminist, has
coined the term "power feminism," which requires individuals to be tolerant of other
women's choices about sexuality and appearance and believes that what every woman does
with her body is her own business. So, arguably, it is acceptable to sleep with your boss to
get the promotion that you have been wanting. Id.
198.
See, e.g., Miller v. Dep't of Corr., 115 P.3d 77, 90 (Cal. 2005) (noting that sexual harassment sends the message that women are only sexual objects and not skillful, qualified workers). When an individual is repeatedly passed up for a promotion by other individuals who have had a sexual relationship with the boss, the same message is being sent.
See id.
199.
EEOC POLICY GUIDANCE, supra note 1 (noting that widespread favoritism can
be a form of "hostile work environment"); see also Miller, 115 P.3d at 90 (recognizing
widespread favoritism under a hostile work environment theory).
200.
See, e.g., Abrams, supra note 27, at 2497.
201.
See Van Tol, supra note 51, at 167.

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30

employment atmospheres.2 °2 Both isolated instances and widespread sexual
favoritism must have legal consequences. 203
Personal and sexual relationships will inevitably remain present in the
workplace. It is ludicrous to even imagine a legal system that would demand that all personal relationships be kept outside the workplace. However, courts have determined how some aspects of our personal lives can
impact our professional relationships. For example, the law cannot demand
that a boss not be a bigot. But, the law may, should, and does demand that a
boss not discriminate based on bigotry. 204 Therefore, regardless of the personal thoughts, feelings, and relationships that might develop in the workplace, it seems logical and fair that employers should not be allowed to favor the employees that they are having sex with as a matter of law. If victims of sexual favoritism can prove that they were not promoted, hired, etc.,
because they were discriminated against based on their gender in conjunction with a sexual relationship between a third-party and the employer, then
that victim should have a chance to seek a remedy.
There was a great need to enforce sexual harassment claims in order to
work toward a more equal work environment between men and women. 205
Now there is a great need to enforce sexual favoritism claims if we are to
continue to strive for equality in the workplace. Like sexual harassment,
sexual favoritism is a logical consequence of persistent gender stereotypes.20 6 Stereotypes that women are inferior to men have not simply van207
Inequality reished, despite what pop-politics might lead us to believe.
mains prevalent in the workplace, if only in the subtle nuances of sexual
favoritism. Therefore, the courts need to revise their treatment of sexual
favoritism cases by giving credence to isolated instances of sexual favoritism as sex discrimination under the sex-plus doctrine.
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